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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early days of oil and gas lease operations, the primary ob-
jective of exploration and drilling was the discovery of oil.' If gas
alone was found, it was generally regarded as a major misfortune.2
However, as some limited markets for gas developed, provision was
made for the lessee to make fixed royalty payments to the lessor on
gas production over the course of the lease.' As the natural gas indus-
try developed and the value of gas increased, it became apparent that
the ultimate value of the gas, and the value of the right to extract and
sell the gas, could no longer be ascertained as of the time of leasing.4
Therefore, the parties to oil and gas leases decided to change their
practice of making periodic fixed payments to one of providing for a
royalty on gas based on either the volume or the value of the gas
produced.5
1. 3 EUGENE 0. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 40.1 (1989).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. KUNTZ, supra note 1, § 40.1.
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Today, the amount of the gas royalty represents an issue of high
contention between the lessor and the lessee.6 Litigation on this issue
is likely to continue because the royalty owner/working interest owner
relationship is inherently fraught with conflict.7 This inherent conflict
exists because a lessor's reserved royalty is traditionally viewed as
being relatively free of up-front risk, while the lessee's interest in the
development of the lease is viewed as highly speculative.8 Thus, while
a lessee is highly conscious of the costs connected with exploration
and production, the lessor does not share these concerns since the roy-
alty is generally due on either the gross value or sales price of the gas
produced.9
The costs which may result in litigation are numerous, but some
of the more common ones include such things as compression, dehy-
dration and gathering. Compression costs occur when the reservoir
pressure is insufficient to force the natural gas being produced into a
pipeline which is itself under pressure. Thus, it becomes necessary to
increase the pressure of the gas after it comes to the surface in order
for it to be marketable. 0 Dehydration is the process of removing
moisture from the gas before it enters the purchaser's pipeline." The
term gathering refers to the process of collecting the gas at the point
of production (ihe wellhead) and moving it to a collection point for
further movement through a pipeline's principal transmission sys-
tem. 2 The potential for litigation could be greatly reduced if royalty
clauses were more detailed and tailored to addressing potential costs
such as compression, dehydration, gathering and transportation." Even
though parties to a contract are always free to allocate these costs, too
6. Owen L. Anderson, Calculating Royalty: "Costs" Subsequent To Production-
"Figures Don't Lie But .... , 33 WASHBuRN L.J. 591 (1994).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 654 n.2 (Colo. 1994) (quoting J. Clayton
La Grone, Calculating the Landowner's Royalty, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 803, 809
(1983)).
11. TXO Prod. Corp. v. State Comm'r of Land Office, 903 P.2d 259, 262 (Okla.
1994).
12. Id.
13. Anderson, supra note 6, at 591.
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often these agreements are silent as to the apportionment of expenses
that may be incurred after the discovery of the gas. 14
While the drafting of more detailed royalty provisions may settle
many of the potential complications with respect to prospective deals,
it would have little, if any, effect on the thousands of existing rela-
tionships that are already governed by traditional lease forms that may
remain in effect for decades. 5 Existing leases could be amended, but
this is doubtful because lessees have generally been reluctant to pro-
pose any amendments to lessors for fear that lessors will drive harder
bargains. 6 Also, lessees believe that most lessors will not bother to
identify royalty payment issues or bother to challenge the lessee's roy-
alty calculations even if the lessors identify the issues. 7
Numerous reasons exist as to why a typical gas lease is silent
concerning the allocation of costs. Often, the parties, in an attempt to
avoid higher legal costs, adopt archaic language from antiquated leases.
The problem with this practice is that many of these antiquated leases
do not anticipate the problems or complexities of the modem gas in-
dustry. A case that dramatizes this point is Southland Royalty Co. v.
Pan American Petroleum Corp.
18
The royalty clause in the Southland case provided as follows:
(1st.) To deliver to the credit of lessor, free of cost, in the pipe line to
which they may connect their wells, the equal one-eighth part of all oil
produced and saved from the leased premises and 1/8 of the net proceeds
of potash and other minerals at the mine.
(2d.) to pay the lessor One Hundred Dollars, each year in advance for the
gas from each well where gas only is found, while the same is being used
off the premises . . . .
The lessee eventually had three gas wells and was producing and
selling more than one million dollars worth of gas each year. However,
the payments were made to the lessor under clause (2), the flat rate
14. Garman, 886 P.2d at 657.
15. Anderson, supra note 6, at 593.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 378 S.W.2d. 50 (Tex. 1964).
19. Id. at 52 (italics omitted).
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clause, and not clause (1), which provided for one-eighth of the net
proceeds.2" Naturally, the lessor brought suit claiming that the royalty
should be based on clause (1). "In an opinion that seems justifiable
only upon the basis of the inequity of paying three hundred dollars
each year for a million dollars worth of gas, the Texas Supreme Court
found for the lessors."'2
It appears that the court, under the guise of the constructional
process, tried to relieve what it felt was unjust enrichment of the les-
sees caused by a lease executed in 1925.22 It seems obvious that the
parties had no intent to include gas in clause (1) by the use of the
term "other minerals," for at the time that the lease was drawn up in
1925, gas was of little value, but potash and oil had wide markets.
The lessors were providing for a share of the value of the minerals
that at that time had a market value. Had the amendment to clause
(1) not been present, the court would have had little alternative but to
find for the lessee. Thus, this case represents a prime example of prob-
lems that may arise where old lease forms have been adopted or kept
in effect for a long period of time.'
Another reason for royalty disputes may be that parties are afraid
to participate in detailed negotiations for fear that some intricate point
might become a "deal buster." The parties do not want to jeopardize
the venture by discussion of what they consider to be potential prob-
lems with the deal. They hope, rather naively, that if any disagree-
ments arise down the road, they will be able to work them out amica-
bly.
Ambiguous terms also contribute to some of the problems connect-
ed with royalty calculations. Terms such as "at the wellhead" and
"market value" appear to mean different things to different people, and
their uses may cause confusion as to the true intention of the parties
when they entered the lease. Thus, the important question becomes:
What costs incurred by the gas lessee may be properly deducted from
the lessor's royalty payment when the lease is silent as to the alloca-
20. RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 7.1 (2d ed. 1983).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. HEMINGWAY, supra note 20, at § 7.1.
25. Id.
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tion of costs? That inquiry is the focus of this Note; its objective is to
provide some guidance on when an agreement does not adequately
address the allocation of costs. This Note will specifically look at the
current status of West Virginia law and what the courts must consider
in settling disputes concerning the allocation of these costs.
II. DEFINITION OF ESSENTIAL TERMINOLOGY
Before one can undertake any meaningful examination of the exist-
ing case law on this subject, there are some concepts and terms of art
that require definition. Terminology such as "market price at the well,"
"market value," and "proceeds" often appear in royalty clauses. The
meaning and connotations associated with these concepts and terms is
critical in ascertaining how a royalty calculation is to be determined.
For example, royalty clauses which include terms such as "market
price at the well" or "price received by the lessee" signal that a royalty
return is to be based upon actual sales in the vicinity of the well.26
Whereas, when the terminology used is "market value," a distinction is
made between actual sales in the vicinity of the well and market value
that can be established by opinion evidence." While, in turn, the term
"proceeds" means that the royalty return will generally be based upon
the aggregate receipts from the sale of the gas products wherever the
sales are made.2"
A. Market Price
In those cases where the royalty clause looks to a "market price at
the well" and where there are comparable sales of similar gas products
in the field, such sales will determine the rate at which the royalty is
to be computed.29 Market price is proven by actual transactions rather
than market value, fair market value, or reasonable worth. In other
words, price relates to actual sales, while value or worth are based on
26. HEMINGWVAY, supra note 20, at § 7.4.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. HEMINGWAY, supra note 20, at § 7.4 (footnote ommitted).
1996] 1203
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opinion.31 When no market can be shown to exist at the well, the cas-
es have held that the royalty will be determined on the price received
at a distant point, less the costs and expenses of transportation.32
"Such costs of transportation will be shared by the lessor, as no duty
exists upon the lessee to construct facilities to transport products to a
distant market. 3:3
B. Market Value
As noted above, there is a distinction between clauses that provide
for market price and those that provide for royalty calculations based
upon market value. 4 Market value, as oppposed to market price, is
determined at the well. 5 Value is distinguishable from price on the
premise that the price of a product may not necessarily reflect its in-
trinsic value. 6
As mentioned above, market price is based upon actual transac-
tions, whereas market value is established by opinion evidence which is
concerned not only with comparable sales, but also with the intrinsic
uses of the product or like products.37 However, there are some deci-
sions where market value is treated the same as market price. For
instance, where actual sales of gas exist in the field, this will generally
indicate that an actual market in the field will be, as a practical matter,
conclusive evidence of value.38
In those instances in which no market exists at the mouth of the
well, the court may construct a value by subtracting the expenses asso-
ciated with processing and transportation from gross receipts.39 There-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Vedder Petroleum Corp. v. Lambert Lands Co., 122 P.2d 600 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1942); Matzen v. Hugoton Prod. Co., 321 P.2d 576, 73 (Kan. 1958); Reed v.
Hackworth, 287 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1950); Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561
(La. 1934); Johnson v. Jemigan, 475 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1970); Freeland v. Sun Oil Co., 277
F.2d 154, (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 826, (1960); LeCuno Oil Co. v. Smith,
306 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)).
34. HEMINGWAY, supra note 20, at § 7.4.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. HEMINGWAY, supra note 20, at § 7.4.
39. Id.
1204 [Vol. 98:1199
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss4/10
A ROYALTYPAIN RV THE GAS
fore, it would appear that even though the computation of royalty
based upon market value differs from that of market price, as a practi-
cal matter the courts have reached almost identical results in either
instance."
C. Proceeds
Royalty formulas can also be based on "proceeds."41 In these cas-
es, "royalty computation will generally be made on the basis of the
aggregate sales price ultimately received from the separate sales of the
constituent products less the cost of marketing, transportation, and
treatment.
42
III. EXISTING CASE LAW
There appears to be no disagreement regarding the general rule
that a royalty is an expense free interest which is paid out of produc-
tion over the life of the lease. "It is free of all costs of development
and production, but may share in any costs incurred subsequent to
production."43 Thus, the problem does not concern production costs,
which are the responsibility of the lessee, but rather the dispute con-
cems who is responsible for the costs after production and what consti-
tutes these costs. More specifically, the question is at what point does
production cease and post-production begin? The answer to this ques-
tion: It depends.
No consensus exists with regard to the allocation of expenses in-
curred after the discovery of gas.44 Even commentators in the oil and
gas field are not in agreement regarding the allocation of post-produc-
tion costs.4" The case law of the oil producing states has developed
40. Id.
41. HEMINGWAY, supra note 20, at § 7.4.
42. Id.
43. Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (citing Alamo Nat'l
Bank of San Antonio v. Hurd, 485 S.W.2d. 335, 338 (Tex. 1972)).
44. Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 657 (Colo. 1994) (citing KuNTZ, supra
note 1, at § 40.5).
45. Id. at 658 n.14. (comparing 3 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL
AND GAS LAW § 645.2 ("'A royalty or other nonoperating interest in production is usually
subject to a proportionate share of the costs incurred subsequent to production where, as is
19961 1205
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two different approaches based upon differing views as to when pro-
duction is established and a royalty interest accrues.4"
A. The Reconstruction Approach
Texas and Louisiana jurisprudence follow the rule that the lessor
must bear its proportionate share of the costs incurred after the gas is
severed from the wellhead.47 In other words, once the gas is severed
from the wellhead it is considered to be "'produced."' 48 Thus, the
lessee's obligation to market is to market at the well.49 In computing
the market value of the gas at the well for the purposes of royalty, the
lessee is entitled to reimbursement for the lessor's proportionate share
of the reasonable cost of transporting the gas to market, dehydrating,
compressing or otherwise making the gas more suitable for marketing
purposes, including extraction costs which are a result of processing."
For instance, in Martin v. Glass,5 insufficient wellhead pressure
caused the lessee to install a compressor to move the gas from two
producing wells on the leased property into a nearby gathering line for
marketing. It was determined that if the gas were not compressed, it
could not be marketed, and would either have to be flared (wasted) or
the wells would have to be shut in.52 The compression charges were
deducted from both the royalty interest and the working interests on a
proportionate basis.5 3 The royalty interest owners objected to the de-
duction, contending that the compression charges were improper and
unauthorized and were a violation of the terms and provisions of the
lease.54
usually the case, the royalty or nonoperating interest is payable 'at the well"') with 3 Eu-
GENE 0. KuNTZ, A TREAnSE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 40.5 ("'It is submitted that
the acts which constitute production have not ceased until a marketable product has been ob-
tained."')).
46. Garman, 886 P.2d at 657.
47. Id.
48. Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1415 (Tex. 1983) (citing Lone Star Gas Co.
v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1962)).
49. Id. at 1412 (quoting 43 Tex. Jur.2d Oil and Gas § 389).
50. Id.
51. 571 F. Supp. 1406 (Tex. 1983).
52. Id. at 1409.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1410.
1206 [Vol. 98:1199
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In this particular case the pertinent parts of the royalty provisions
of the lease were as follows: "3. The royalties to be paid by Lessee
are: ... (b) on gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous sub-
stance, produced from said land and sold on or off the premises, one-
eighth of the net proceeds at the well received from the sale there-
of. . . ."" In resolving whether the compression charges were de-
ductible under the lease, the court stated that "it must first be deter-
mined where said instrument establishes the point fixing the price."56
In applying Texas law, the court held that because of the net-pro-
ceeds-at-the-well royalty provision, the royalty interest owners could be
charged for their proportionate share of the cost of compression to
move the gas from the producing wells into the gathering lines.5 7 The
court's decision was based on a finding that gas production had already
been obtained from the wells before compression was required."
In Parker v. TXO Production Corp.,59 a case factually similar to
Martin, the Texas Court of Appeals held that, absent contrary terms in
the lease, compression costs which are required to increase production
are not chargeable to the royalty interest owners, but that post-produc-
tion costs of compressing gas to make it deliverable into a purchaser's
pipeline are normally to be borne proportionately by the operator and
the royalty interest owners.6
Louisiana law concurs with Texas, in that both jurisdictions allow
for the lessee to deduct post-production costs when the royalty payment
is determined at the "mouth of the well."6 However, Louisiana differs
slightly in that it applies what is called a reconstruction approach in
determining market value. 2 The reconstruction approach begins with
the gross proceeds from the sale of the gas and deducts all costs of
55. Martin, 571 F. Supp. at 1410
56. Id. at 1411.
57. Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp., 854 P.2d 880, 887 (Okla. 1992) (Opala, J., dissent-
ing).
58. Id.
59. 716 S.W.2d 644 (rex. Civ. App. 1986).
60. Wood, 854 P.2d at 887.
61. Merritt v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 499 So. 2d 210, 214 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1986).
62. Id. at 213.
1996] 1207
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taking the gas from the wellhead (the point of production) to the point
of sale. 3
In Merritt v. Southwestern Electric Power Co.,64 the parties stipu-
lated that "[c]ompression of the gas produced from the Lathan Well
was, and remains, necessary to maintain a flow pressure in the gather-
ing system in excess of 700 Psig. Without the compression, no gas
produced from the Lathan Well could be sold . . .. ",5 With no pur-
chaser or market for the gas at the wellhead because of its low pres-
sure, the gas was useless and had no market value at the wellhead
until it could be moved into the gathering line by compression.66 In
determining whether compression costs were deductible from the gas
royalty, the Louisiana court, like the courts in Texas, first examined
the lease to ascertain the point at which the royalty clause fixed the
price of the gas.67
The court held that unless parties to a lease agree otherwise, a
lessee can deduct a proportionate share of post-production compression
costs from the royalty payments under a market-value-at-the-well provi-
sion.68 In this particular case, the lease did not either expressly permit
or prohibit a deduction for compression costs.69 The Louisiana court
agreed with the Texas court's holding in Martin, stating that "compres-
sion which is necessary for the gas to reach the wellhead is a produc-
tion cost, but compression that is necessary only to push the gas from
a producing well into a pipeline is a post-production cost or marketing
cost which is deductible from royalty payments."7 Thus, in Louisiana,
unless an express provision to the contrary is found in a lease, the cost
of marketing gas once it has been produced, is shared by the lessor
and lessee under a market value lease.7"
63. Id. (citing Wall v. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co., 152 So. 561 (La. 1934)).
64. 499 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 213.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Wood, 854 P.2d at 887.
69. Id.
70. Id. (footnote omitted).
71. Merritt, 499 So. 2d at 214 (citing Crichton v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 150 So.
668 (La. 1933)).
1208 [Vol. 98:1199
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B. The Implied Duty to Market Theory
While Texas and Louisiana follow the rule that the lessor must
bear its proportionate share of the costs incurred after the gas is sev-
ered from the wellhead, other states have adopted a contrary rule
which is based on a lessee's implied duty to market gas produced
under an oil and gas lease.72 The implied duty to market theory obli-
gates the lessee to incur those post-production costs which are neces-
sary to place the gas in a condition acceptable for market.73
Ample authority exists for the general proposition that, in the
absence of an express provision in the lease to the contrary, the lessee
owes the lessor an implied duty to market the royalty gas produced.74
Under the implied duty to market theory, the lessee has a duty to not
only get the product to the place of sale in marketable form,75 but
also to act in good faith and exercise due diligence in the marketing of
the gas.7
6
For example, "Kansas has always recognized the duty of the lessee
under an oil and gas lease not only to find if there is oil and gas but
to use reasonable diligence in finding a market for the prod-
uct ... ,77 Wyoming, which also follows the implied duty to market
theory, has even gone so far as to codify the marketability approach.78
Even the Federal government requires that a lessee "place residue gas
and gas plant products in marketable condition at no cost to the Feder-
72. Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 658 (Colo. 1994).
73. Id.
74. KUNTZ, supra note 1, at § 40.5.
75. Wood, 854 P.2d at 882.
76. KUNT, supra note 1, at § 40.5.
77. Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602, 606 (Kan. 1964) (citing Buffalo Val-
ley Oil & Gas Co. v. Jones, 88 P. 537 (Kan. 1907); Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
106 P. 47) (Kan. 1910).
78. Garman, 886 P.2d at 658, n.16. ("Wyo.Stat. § 30-5-304(a)(vi) (1994 Supp.) pro-
vides in pertinent part: 'Costs of production: means all costs incurred for exploration, [and]
development . . . operations including, but not limited to . . . gathering, compressing ...
dehydrating, separating . . . or transporting . . . the gas into the market pipeline. 'Costs of
production' does not include the reasonable and actual direct costs associated with transport-
ing . . . the gas from the point of entry into the market pipeline or the processing of gas
in a processing plant."').
19961 1209
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al Government. . . unless otherwise provided in the lease agree-
ment.
' 79
Arkansas and North Dakota can also be counted among those that
follow the marketability approach when the lease is silent with respect
to the allocation of post-production costs. In Arkansas, when a lease is
silent as to the allocation of post-production costs, a clause that pro-
vides for the lessor to receive "proceeds at the well for all gas" is
interpreted to mean gross proceeds."0 In North Dakota, if the lease
does not state otherwise, royalty payments which are based on the
percentage of total proceeds received by the lessee, without deduction
for costs, are to be paid to the lessor.8
Although the implied duty to market answers the question of the
lessee's duty to absorb all costs involved in the marketing of the gas,
it does not address the issue as to which party or parties must bear any
added expense which might be incidental to preparing the gas for mar-
ket. 2 This difficulty can be avoided by recognizing that there is a dif-
ference between those acts which constitute production and those which
constitute processing or refining of the substance extracted by produc-
tion. 3 Under most leases, it is understood that the lessee will bear the
costs associated with production, but this does not justify imposing on
the lessee the costs of refining or processing the product, unless an
intention to do so is revealed by the lease.84 Once a marketable prod-
uct has been obtained then production has ceased." Once the market-
able product has been obtained, the costs in improving or transporting
the gas should be shared by both the lessee and the lessor.86
It is not always easy to determine when a marketable product has
been obtained. However, a good rule of thumb is that if there is a
commercial market, then a marketable product has been obtained and
further processing should be treated as refining to increase the value of
79. 30 C.F.R. § 206.153(i) (1995).
80. Garman, 886 P.2d at 658 (citing Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d
563, 565 (Ark. 1988)).
81. Id. (citing West v. Alpar Resources, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484, 491 (N.D. 1980)).
82. KUNTZ, supra note 1, at § 40.5.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. KUNTZ, supra note 1, at § 40.5.
1210 [Vol. 98:1199
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a marketable product." Whereas, if no commercial market is avail-
able, the lessee's responsibilities theoretically have not ended, and the
lessee must still absorb the costs of making the gas marketable.8
The Kansas and Arkansas approach, which burdens the lessee with
post-production costs, can be traced back to a trilogy of cases: Gilmore
v. Superior Oil Co.," Schupbach v. Continental Oil Co.,90 and
Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor.91 The Kansas Supreme Court in
Gilmore held that a lessee has a duty to pay for gas compression ex-
penses which are necessary to make gas marketable, and that those
expenses are not deductible from the royalty interest.92 The basis for
the court's decision was that since the lessee has a duty to market the
gas, it necessarily follows that the lessee has the obligation of prepar-
ing the gas for market if it is unmerchantable in its natural state.93
Thus, costs involving marketing or preparation for sale are not charge-
able to the lessor.9" The Kansas court, in Schupbach, followed the
rationale of Gilmore on the general ground that the case scenarios were
identical.9"
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Hanna held that when a gas lease
contains a proceeds royalty clause, then a lessee may not deduct com-
pression costs from the royalty payments.96 According to the Arkansas
court, a contract which is silent regarding the apportionment of com-
pression costs, obligates the lessee, rather than the lessor, to bear those
post-production expenses.97
In Hanna, the royalty clause stated that: "Lessee shall pay Lessor
one-eighth of the proceeds received by Lessee at the well for all
gas . . . produced from the leased premises and sold by Lessee." 8
The court's rationale that compression costs were nondeductible from
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964).
90. 394 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1964).
91. 759 S.W.2d 563 (Ark. 1988).
92. See Wood, 854 P.2d at 885.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 885 n.14.
96. See Wood, 854 P.2d at 885.
97. Id. at 886.
98. Id. at 885 n.15.
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the royalty payment rested on two factors: (1) the court focused on the
word "proceeds" and held that based on its common meaning the les-
see could not deduct compression costs, and (2) the parties' construc-
tion of the agreement was shown by the lessee's conduct in waiting
two and one-half years before deducting compression costs.99
C. The Reconstruction Approach v. The Implied Duty to Market
Theory
The difference in the two approaches can best be illustrated by
comparing the Oklahoma case of Wood v. TXO Production Corp.'0
with the Texas case of Martin v. Glass.' In the Martin decision, the
Texas court allowed for the deduction of compression costs from the
royalty interest. The pertinent part .of the gas royalty provision read:
"[t]he royalties to be paid by Lessee are: .. . (b) on gas . . . produced
from said land and sold on or off the premises, one-eighth of the net
proceeds at the well received from the sale thereof . . ,.0. The
facts presented at trial established that the wells involved in the Glass-
Martin lease had sufficient pressure to bring the gas to the wellhead or
mouth of the well. °3 The problem was that there was insufficient
pressure at the wellhead to enable the gas to flow into the purchaser's
gathering lines without compression. 4 According to the court, the
gas was useless and had no market value unless it was moved into the
gathering lines."5 The court further stated that because there was no
purchaser, or market, for the low pressure gas as it existed in the well-
head there was no market for the gas at the well.'0 6 Therefore, the
court stated "[t]hus, compression being required to market the gas, said
charges were post-production costs and as such were properly deduct-
ible from nonoperating interests."'0 7 It appears that the court rational-
ized that the lessee had fulfilled his duty by obtaining gas capable of
99. Id.
100. 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992).
101. 571 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
102. Martin, 571 F. Supp. at 1410.
103. Id at 1415.
104. Id. at 1416.
105. Id.
106. Martin, 571 F. Supp. at 1416.
107. Id.
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producing in paying quantities, and that the lessee should not have to
bear alone the costs of enhancing the product obtained. °8
In contrast, the Wood court rejected the view of the Texas court,
which makes a distinction between production and post-production
costs, holding instead that the lessor must bear its proportionate share
of post-production costs. °9 The Oklahoma court was not, based on
the facts before it, prepared to require the lessor to bear compression
costs as a matter of law where there was no agreement between the
lessor and the lessee to share those costs."' Instead, the court chose
to follow the theory that marketing expenses should be included as part
of the lessee's operating costs on the basis that without marketing,
there is no production in paying quantities."'
In Wood, the question presented to the court was whether a gas
lessee, who was obligated to pay the lessor 3/16 of the market price at
the well for the gas sold, was entitled to deduct the cost of compres-
sion from the lessor's royalty interest."1 Initially, the wells involved
in the lease produced at a pressure sufficient to enter the purchasers'
lines without the aid of artificial compression. However, after pressure
from the two wells fell below the required pressure for delivery, TXO
was forced to set compressors on the leased premises. TXO then sub-
tracted the lessors' proportionate share of the compression costs from
the royalty payments due to the lessors for production from the two
wells. The lessors sued to recover the withheld compression charges.
TXO argued that without compression, there would be no sale and
thus, no royalty for the lessor.1 ' The court found this argument un-
persuasive and stated that "[t]here are many steps in the production or
post-production processes that, if not performed, would result in no
sale. The lessee is in a position to provide specifically in its leases that
lessors will be required to share in compression costs."1 4 Thus, the
court held that the compression charges were not deductible from the
royalty payment because the lessee must bear the costs when compres-
108. See Wood, 854 P.2d at 881.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Wood, 854 P.2d at 880.
113. Id. at 881.
114. Id.
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sion is required in order to market the gas.' 5 In the view of the
Oklahoma court, the implied duty to market meant a duty to get the
product to the place of sale in marketable form."6 Therefore, the les-
see bore the risk that, in exploring for the gas, the well would be low
pressure." 7
While there is a split of authority concerning the allocation of
these costs, there are some points of agreement. Most courts seem to
concur that the expense of transportation to a distant market should not
be the exclusive burden of the lessee. Even states such as Kansas,
which follows the implied duty to market theory, believe that the costs
of transportation to a distant market must be borne proportionately by
the lessor. When it comes to transportation costs it appears to be irrel-
evant whether the formula for computation relates to the mouth of the
well or at the ultimate point of sale."' In Matzen v. Hugoton Pro-
duction Co.," 9 the court stated:
It was as much Hugoton's duty to find a market on the leased premises
without cost to the plaintiffs as it was to find and produce the gas . . .;
but that duty did not extend to providing a gathering system to transport
and process the gas off the leases at a large capital outlay with attending
financial hazards in order to obtain a market at which the gas might be
sold.'20
However, the courts do not concur on how to treat the costs of
preparation of the products for market that do not necessarily involve
capital expenditures, such as the costs of compression, dehydration, and
other processes related to preparing the gas for market.
[S]ome courts would charge the lessor with his proportionate share of the
costs of dehydration and other preparation for market. Where the royalty
clause applies the compensation formula 'at the well,' some courts have
approached the question by charging the lessee with all non-extraordinary
costs of market preparation. However, an analysis on the basis of the
nature of the cost or the place of sale is unsatisfactory.
115. Id. at 883.
116. Wood, 854 P.2d at 882.
117. Id.
118. HEMINGWAY, supra note 20, at § 7.4.
119. 321 P.2d 576 (Kan. 1958).
120. HEMINGWAY, supra note 20, at § 7.4 (quoting Matzen v. Hugoton Prod. Co., 321
P.2d 576 (Kan. 1958) (citations omitted).
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The better approach would seem to be whether such costs are con-
ceived to be within the implied obligation of the lessee to market the
products from the lease. Those cases would charge all such costs to the
lessee that they find are within such an implied obligation. On the other
hand, the contrary result is justified upon the counter-argument that where
the lessee has, by such acts or treatment, given or enhanced the value of
the product the lessor should not share in the enhanced value without
sharing part of the costs. It cannot be said that any particular view pre-
vails, with the exception that Kansas appears to find the costs chargeable
against the lessee only, whereas the opposite view appears to be espoused
in Louisiana.'
IV. ANALYSIS
Considering that West Virginia is a large gas producing state, it is
somewhat surprising that an examination of the current status of West
Virginia law indicates that the court has not yet addressed the issue of
what costs are deductible from a royalty payment when the lease is
silent regarding the allocations of costs after the discovery of gas.
Thus, West Virginia has yet to decide whether it would follow the
implied duty to market theory, like Kansas and Oklahoma, or the theo-
ry that gas is considered produced once it is severed from the well-
head, which has been adopted in states such as Texas and Louisiana.
An inquiry into West Virginia case law may, however, be beneficial in
shedding some light on how the court would rule if confronted with
this issue. While these cases are not specifically on point, they do offer
some insight on how the court views the relationship between the les-
sor and the lessee.
"In many jurisdictions the word 'royalty' has a definite and unam-
biguous meaning denoting a fractional interest in production, free of
costs and expense, which will not share or participate in bonus, delay
rentals, or power to lease."' 22 West Virginia shares this view. In Da-
vis v. Hardman,' the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stat-
ed:
121. HEMINGwAY, supra note 20, at § 7.4 (footnotes omitted).
122. HEMINGWVAY, supra note 20, at § 2.7 (footnote omitted).
123. 133 S.E.2d 77 (NV. Va. 1963).
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The distinguishing characteristics of a non-participating royalty interest are:
(1) Such share of production is not chargeable with any of the costs of
discovery and production; (2) the owner has no right to do any act or
thing to discover and produce the oil and gas; (3) the owner has no right
to grant leases; and (4) the owner has no right to receive bonuses or delay
rentals. Conversely, the distinguishing characteristics of an interest in min-
erals in place are: (1) Such interest is not free of costs of discovery and
production; (2) the owner has the right to do any and all acts necessary to
discover and produce oil and gas; (3) the owner has the right to grant
leases, and (4) the owner has the right to receive bonuses and delay rent-
als.1
2 4
Like all the other jurisdictions, West Virginia follows the concept that
a royalty always presupposes development or production of gas.'2 1 It
is also well established in West Virginia that "when a lessee under an
oil and gas lease produces gas from the well the right to produce such
gas becomes a vested right and when the gas is extracted the title to
the gas vests in the lessee and the consideration or royalty paid for the
privilege of search and production is rent for the leased premises.'
'1 6
The court has also held that in construing a deed or other legal instru-
ment, that it is the function of the court to ascertain the intent of the
parties as expressed in the language used by them.
2 1
It is this author's belief that when a gas lease is silent regarding
the allocation of costs post discovery, the West Virginia court should
follow the implied duty to market theory, rather than the view es-
poused by jurisdictions such as Texas and Louisiana. That is, West
Virginia should reject the position that gas is considered produced
when severed from the wellhead.
Even though West Virginia has not been directly confronted with
an issue that has required it to accept either one of these theories, a
reasonable interpretation of how the court views the relationship be-
tween the royalty interest owner and the working interest owner tends
to show that the court would be more inclined to accept the implied
duty to market theory. For example, Davis v. Hardman has been inter-
124. Id. at 81 (quoting Mounger v. Pittman, 108 So. 2d 565 (Miss. 1959)).
125. McIntosh v. Vail, 28 S.E.2d 95, 97 (W. Va. 1943).
126. Breedlove v. Pennzoil Co., 399 S.E.2d 187, 191 (W. Va. 1990).
127. Id. at 81 (citing Hall v. Hartley, 119 S.E.2d 759 (W. Va. 1961); Stephenson v.
Kuntz, 49 S.E.2d 235 (W. Va. 1948); Swope v. Pageton Pocahontas Coal Co., 41 S.E.2d
691 (W. Va. 1947); Bruen v. Thaxton, 28 S.E.2d 59 (W. Va. 1943)).
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preted as defining a royalty interest as a grant or reservation creating a
non-cost bearing interest that will share in only a fractional portion of
the gross production, and will not participate in bonus, delay rentals or
the power to lease.12 1 It also seems to indicate the court's recognition
of the fact that once the lessor has been granted a royalty interest that
he has parted with input into the cost-bearing decisions.
A number of other reasons exist as to why West Virginia should
adopt the implied duty to market theory over the theory that the royal-
ty interest owner should share in the costs after the gas is severed
from the wellhead. The most compelling reason for opting for the
implied duty to market theory, and allocating costs to the lessee, is
traceable to the basic difference between the cost bearing interests and
the royalty interests.129 Even though a lease is entered into for the
benefit of both parties, in most instances the parties do not participate
equally in gas development decisions.130 In most cases the lessor de-
fers to the lessee, who is the risk-bearing party, to decide such things
as where and when to drill, the formations to be tested, and ultimately
whether to complete a well and establish production.' Thus, this re-
lationship between the parties calls for a "free-ride" for the lessor with
respect to all costs incurred to establish a marketable product.3 2
Paying parties, on the other hand, do not have a "free-ride." They
do, however, normally have input into the proposed procedures and
expenditures, and ultimately have the right to disagree with the course
of conduct selected by the lessee."3 Royalty interest owners, howev-
er, do not have such rights. 34 Therefore, the lessor, as the owner of
the minerals, grants an oil and gas lease, retaining a smaller interest in
exchange for the risk-bearing working interest receiving the lion's share
of the proceeds for developing the minerals and bearing the costs
thereof.'35 The mineral owner's decision on whether to lease or to
become a working interest owner is based in large part upon the costs
128. HEMINGWAY, supra note 20, at § 2.7.
129. Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 660 (Colo. 1994).
130. Id. at 657.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Garman, 886 P.2d at 660.
134. Id.
135. Wood, 854 P.2d at 882.
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involved.'36 Once the royalty owner makes the decision to lease, he
forfeits any right to have input into the cost-bearing decisions." 7 If a
royalty owner were required to share in the costs it would in effect
force the royalty owner to share in the burdens of the working interest
ownership without the attendant rights. 8
A royalty interest owner should be able to make an informed eco-
nomic decision whether he wants to enter into an oil and gas lease or
whether to participate as a working interest owner."9 Therefore, a
lessee who wishes for a royalty interest owner to share in such costs
as compression, gathering and dehydration should spell it out in the
lease.4 It would not be unreasonable to expect the West Virginia
court to adopt this rationale. In Cole v. Pond Fork Oil & Gas Co., 4
the court stated:
A lessor of oil and gas parts with all right and control over the production
of his property, save and except the right to insist upon protection of the
leased property by reasonable development under the lease; but generally
speaking, he parts with every vestige of control over the actual production
of oil and gas in the property he leases." 2
Thus, West Virginia, like other jurisdictions, recognizes that the royalty
interest owner parts with the control and the risk in return for a small-
er economic interest.
Another compelling reason for adopting the implied duty to market
theory is that an inequality may not only exist in development deci-
sions, but also in the bargaining position of the parties. Ordinarily the
lessor will be an individual landowner who is not well educated in the
customs and practices of the gas industry, whereas the lessee will tend
to be a large corporation which is better suited to anticipate all the
issues and problems that may arise in a gas deal. As a result, the les-
sor is usually ill-equipped to deal with the more sophisticated lessee
when it comes to entering an agreement concerning the exploration of
136. Id. at 883.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Wood, 854 P.2d at 883.
140. Id.
141. 35 S.E.2d 25 (W. Va. 1945).
142. Id. at 29.
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gas. Therefore, the burden should rest with the lessee in providing for
a costs provision clause in the lease that stipulates which costs may be
deducted from the royalty payment. By doing so, the lessor would be
better able to make an informed economic decision on whether to
participate as a risk-bearing party or a non-risk-bearing party.
When the lease fails to provide for the apportionment of costs
after the discovery of gas, the rule that the lessee has an implied duty
to market the product appears to be more equitable than the rule es-
poused by Texas and Louisiana that the non-operating interest must
bear its proportionate share of costs incurred after gas is severed at the
wellhead. The lessee is in the better position to anticipate and provide
solutions to any possible costs that may arise. Therefore, it is the les-
see that should bear the burden if the lease fails to provide for appor-
tionment of costs after production. The implied duty to market theory
puts this burden where it belongs, on the lessee, and not the lessor, as
does the contrary rule that gas is produced when severed at the well-
head, and thus, costs are to be shared. Therefore, it would appear that
the equitable solution would be to place the burden on the lessee to
negotiate a lease which covers all the possible cost scenarios that may
arise.
It can be argued that the implied duty to market theory places an
undue burden on the lessee when he fails to include a cost provision in
the lease.'43 Some authorities consider this solution to be harsh and
untenable because it saddles the lessee with the sole responsibility for
adding a cost apportionment clause to the lease and makes the lessee
responsible for all post-production costs.1" However, while this may
be true, for the reasons mentioned above, it would seem that equity
would require that the lessee bear the responsibility for providing for a
cost provision in a lease as opposed to the lessor.
V. CONCLUSION
It should be emphasized that parties contracting for oil and gas
leases are always free to allocate the costs of compression, transporta-
143. Wood, 854 P.2d at 883.
144. Id. (Opala, J., dissenting) (joining Chief Justice Opala were Vice Chief Justice
Hodges, and Justices Lavender and Watt).
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tion and processing in their agreements, thereby avoiding many of the
potential problems discussed herein.' However, it must be recog-
nized that all too often lease agreements fail to apportion expenses that
may be incurred after the discovery of oil or gas.146
In the likely event that the West Virginia courts are faced with
this issue, they would be wise to adopt the implied duty to market
theory, thereby, putting the onus on the lessee to either provide up
front in the lease for the apportionment of costs after the discovery of
the gas, or in those instances where the lease is silent as to who will
incur the cost, to place the burden on the lessee to cover those costs.
These include costs which are incurred for compression, gathering,
and dehydration or any other costs which are incurred in an effort to
make the gas marketable. As for those costs which are incurred for the
purposes of enhancing the value of the gas after a marketable product
is obtained, if the lessor is to share in the profits after enhancement of
the gas then he should be required to proportionately share in the costs
of enhancing the gas.
Regarding transportation costs, even in jurisdictions such as Okla-
homa, where the lessee is obligated to develop the gas he has found so
that it will bring the highest possible market value, the lessee is not
required to provide for pipeline facilities beyond the lease premises.'47
Kansas courts have also held that the lessee has a general duty to see
that the gas is marketed, but that it is not required to pay the lessor's
share of transportation charges from the well to some distant place. 4 '
Thus, in West Virginia when a gas lease is silent as what costs a
lessee may properly deduct from a lessor's royalty payment, the lessee
should bear the costs under the implied duty to market theory if those
costs do not involve enhancing the product or transporting it to some
place of sale off the leased premises.
Robert S. Raynes, Jr.
145. Garman, 886 P.2d at 657.
146. Id.
147. Johnson v. Jemigan, 475 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla. 1970).
148. Garman, 886 P.2d at 654 n.1.
1220 [Vol. 98:1199
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss4/10
